'Our minds did not evolve to serve as
instruments for observing themselves, but for solving such practical problems
as nutrition, defense, and reproduction' (Marvin Minsky 2006).
Marvin Minsky is a pioneer in the field of machine intelligence. Efforts at developing machine
intelligence have resulted in deep insights into how the human brain functions.
In 1986 Minsky published the book The Society of Mind, in which he
formulated his ideas about human cognition. His next book, The Emotion Machine, published in
2006, reflected the progress made at that time in gaining insights into the
workings of the human mind via the machine-intelligence approach.
Minsky’s
‘society’ of mind comprises of ‘agents’ or ‘resources', which are the simplest
individuals that populate the brain. Each agent or resource can be visualized
as a typical component of a computer program, like a simple subroutine or data
structure. The agents can get connected and composed into larger systems called
agencies or societies of agents. The agencies
self-organize into still larger conglomerates that can perform still more
complex functions, and so on into still higher and higher levels of
self-organization and complexity, ultimately leading to the emergence of abilities we attribute to
minds. There is a hierarchical
structure and organization, like in any complex adaptive system.
The idea of
hierarchical levels of organization was well documented in an earlier
publication of Minsky (1980):
'One could say but
little about "mental states" if one imagined the Mind to be a single,
unitary thing. But if we envision a mind (or brain) as composed of many
partially autonomous "agents" — a "Society" of smaller
minds — then we can interpret "mental state" and "partial mental
state" in terms of subsets of the states of the parts of the mind. To
develop this idea, we will imagine first that this Mental Society works much
like any human administrative organization. On the largest scale are gross
"Divisions" that specialize in such areas as sensory processing,
language, long-range planning, and so forth. Within each Division are
multitudes of subspecialists — call them "agents" — that embody smaller
elements of an individual's knowledge, skills, and methods. No single one of
these little agents knows very much by itself, but each recognizes certain
configurations of a few associates and responds by altering its state'.
As is the case
with any complex adaptive system, we cannot
predict with certainty the properties of the mind-system in terms of the laws
of physics applied to the constituent agents, nor can we start from the
observed complexity of the brain and work our way downwards all the way to
understand why the increasing complexity took a particular route in phase space
[please note that 'deterministic' and 'unpredictable' are not mutually
exclusive propositions in physics]. To quote Minsky (1990):
‘The functions
performed by the brain are the products of the work of thousands of different,
specialized sub-systems, the intricate product of hundreds of millions of years
of biological evolution. We cannot hope to understand such an organization by
emulating the techniques of those particle physicists who search for the
simplest possible unifying conceptions. Constructing a mind is simply a
different kind of problem — of how to synthesize organizational systems that can
support a large enough diversity of different schemes, yet enable them to work
together to exploit one another's abilities’.
Here is Minsky’s (1986) take on
consciousness:
‘In this book,
the word (consciousness) is used mainly for the myth that human minds are
"self aware" in the sense of perceiving what happens inside
themselves. I maintain that human consciousness can never represent what is
occurring at the present moment, but only a little of the recent past --
partly because each agency has a limited capacity to represent what
happened recently and partly because it takes time for agencies to communicate
with one another. Consciousness is peculiarly hard to describe because each
attempt to examine temporary memories distorts the very records it is trying to
inspect’.
Minsky also described ‘free will’ as a myth, the myth that human volition is based
upon some third alternative to either causality or chance.
The ‘Single-Self’ concept
Some people still subscribe to the concept that
there is creature (or a set of creatures) inside us that does all the feeling
or thinking for us, and makes all the important decisions for us. It is our
‘identity’ or ‘self’. Even our legal system distinguishes between deliberate
wilful murder, and murder that was not pre-planned. This Single-Self concept
may possibly be useful as a meme, but has no scientific basis.
Why do humans entertain such fiction? It may be
partly because it makes life look pleasant ‘by hiding from us how much we're
controlled by all sorts of conflicting, unconscious goals’. According to
Minsky:
‘That image makes us efficient, whereas better
ideas might slow us down. It would take too long for our hardworking minds to
understand everything all the time. However, although the Single-Self concept
has practical uses, it does not help us to understand ourselves — because it does
not provide us with smaller parts we could use to build theories of what we
are. When you think of yourself as a single thing, this gives you no clues
about issues like these: What determines the subjects I think about? How do I
choose what next to do? How can I solve this difficult problem? Instead, the
Single-Self concept offers only useless answers like these: My Self selects
what to think about. My Self decides what I should do next. I should try to
make my Self get to work’.
He goes on to say that: ‘Whenever you think
about your "Self" you are switching among a huge network of models,
each of which tries to represent some particular aspects of your mind—to
answer some questions about yourself’.