'Just when
you think you’ve won the rat race, along come faster rats' (Anon.).
Living
organisms interact, not only with the inanimate surroundings, but also with
organisms of the same or different species. Therefore, evolution of a species
cannot occur in isolation from the evolution of other species with which it
interacts. They coevolve. Coevolution of species is an important aspect of biological evolution.
Darwin’s
theory of evolution says that a species evolves to become better and better for
the task of survival in a given set of conditions. Genes of individuals in the
population that are not good enough for the task of survival tend to get
eliminated in successive generations. All this happens through an interplay of
the blind forces of Nature, but the end effect appears to be as if the genes
have the thinking power of being 'selfish' at the job of survival and
propagation. Richard Dawkins’ (1989) phrase the selfish gene sums up the situation well.
This may seem
to indicate that a species will always evolve strategies (consciously or 'purely
chemically') that are entirely selfish when it comes to dealing with other
species. In fact, even within a species, it is conceivable that the genotype,
and thence the phenotype, of an individual member may exhibit selfishness,
without regard for other members of the species. But what happens in reality
can actually be far from this simple-minded speculation. There can be evolutionarily stable strategies, involving
both competition and cooperation, and there can be evolutionary arms races. There can
also be symbioses of species.
Before I
discuss some of these processes, it is interesting to take note of an analysis
by Douglas Caldwell (cf. Margulis and Sagan 2002), according
to which the following terms were never used by Charles Darwin in his Origin of Species: association;
affiliation; cooperate, cooperation; collaborate, collaboration; community;
intervention; symbiosis. What I am now going to describe in this and the next few
posts are some of the post-Darwinian developments.
Coevolution of
species is an important ingredient of the succession of turmoil and relative
stability (stasis), so that what
really unfolds is punctuated equilibrium.
Although
species tend to evolve towards a state of stable adaptation to the existing
environment, it is also true that many of them are extinct, as the fossil
records show. This is because there is never a state of permanent, static
equilibrium in Nature. There is a never-ending input of energy, climatic
changes, terrestrial upheavals, as also mutations and a coexistence with other
competing or cooperating species. Rather than evolving towards a state of
permanent equilibrium and adaptation, the entirety of species (in fact, the
Earth as a whole) evolves towards a state of self-organized criticality (SOC). This state of complexity is poised at
the edge of order and chaos. The
never-ending inputs just mentioned result in minor or major ‘avalanches’
(catastrophic events of various magnitudes), which sometimes lead to the
extinction of species, or the emergence of new ones.
SOC can
explain the finding by Eldredge and Gould (1972) in fossil records that there are long periods
of stasis, followed by quick bursts of evolutionary change; i.e. there is
punctuated equilibrium. Imagine an ecosystem in which the various species have
reached more or less a state of equilibrium with one another. Suppose there is
a random genetic crossover in one of the species that is beneficial to it and
thus survives and gets propagated to other members of the population. The
propagation is not linear; it is more likely to be avalanche-like or
‘explosive’ with time, rather like the avalanches in the sandpile experiment I
described in Part 82. In due
course, things stop changing, but then some other member of the population may
mutate. There is thus a steady drizzle of mutations, resulting in periods of
avalanches and relative equilibrium.
As I have
explained in the previous few posts, in conventional game theory it is usually
presumed that each player is a rational
being who expects that other players are also rational beings. Each player
therefore adopts a strategy to minimize his losses, assuming that other players
will work out strategies to maximize the losses of other players as they try to
minimize their own losses (the minimax strategy). In the evolutionary context,
if each member of a population did this, the end result may be an extinction of
that species. The fact that a species has survived can imply that an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) must have evolved. In an ESS, the
survival of an individual, though not completely subservient to the survival of
the species, is determined by a strategy that ensures that contests between
individuals, though leading to an improvement of the gene pool of the
population, do not result in an excessive annihilation of the contest-losers.
The ESS idea, which entailed a modification of conventional game theory, was
put forward by Maynard Smith (1974, 1976, 1982), and it can
be operative even in the coevolution
of two or more species. In fact, the ESS concept is also relevant to the
evolution of entire ecosystems.
I shall
discuss the ESS notion in the next two posts.
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